Chinese Defense, Security and Space Policy

China’s Anti-Satellite Test: A 21st Century Sputnik?

Policy Brief
August 2007
Kathleen Walsh, US Naval War College, Primary Editor

For the past few years, analysts concerned with maintaining US competitiveness in the face of rising Chinese technological capability have promoted the idea of a pending “Sputnik” moment when US policymakers and public would be rudely shaken from their apathy by a surprising technological advance by the People’s Republic of China.  The analogy references the shock felt across American society when the Soviet Union demonstrated its ability to launch the world’s first orbital satellite – an event that served to accelerate the US space program and sparked a decades-long US-Soviet arms race.  Yet, the Sputnik moment with regard to China may have happened in a more literal sense and sooner than expected when on January 11th, 2007, the PRC successfully demonstrated an ability to intercept a satellite in orbit with a ground-based ballistic missile.  While not entirely a surprise among those who closely monitor China’s space activities, the public demonstration marked China as only the third state ever to prove such a capability, mimicking US and Soviet tests conducted in the 1980s.  In response, the international community was quick to condemn the test, though the public reaction has been reasonably short-lived.  Nonetheless, the test and its significance continue to be debated among experts in academia, industry, and government.   

In the meantime, what are we to make of this anti-satellite (ASAT) feat?  It is essential first to lay out the facts of the case in order to understand the test’s ultimate significance.  These are laid out in the initial section below.  Even with the facts established, however, several interpretations of China’s intentions have emerged, with no clear consensus among experts on which –or which combination-- most accurately reflects Chinese government policy.  The essay ends with a brief discussion of US policy responses to the January 2007 Chinese ASAT test, and what might be in store for future US-China relations.

China’s ASAT Test:  The Facts

On January 12th, 2007, early morning local time, China tested an anti-satellite weapon using a direct-ascent, kinetic-kill vehicle in the form of a ballistic missile, which destroyed its target: the FY-1C weather satellite. 

 
Image source:  Federation of American Scientists

This was not China’s first such attempt.  US officials from the State Department and the military have stated that China made a series of earlier attempts over the past few years, to which the US Government did not publicly respond.   Close followers of China’s space activities were not entirely surprised by the test either, pointing to indications that Beijing has been interested in ASAT and other asymmetric capabilities for some time.  In fact, several press accounts cite an earlier incident in which Chinese lasers “dazzled” US satellites.   Also, earlier annual Pentagon reports to Congress on China’s military modernization have indicated that the Department of Defense (DoD) has had confidence that the PRC was in fact developing and might also field an ASAT weapon launched on a ballistic missile or space-launched vehicle.

While the US Government continued to monitor China’s space activities, the first public indications among Western analysts that something of an interesting nature had occurred in the heavens came via an online discussion on January 17th, 2007.  A well-recognized analyst of Chinese space and arms control matters, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, had noticed chatter on a web-based, satellite observer email service about an unusual space debris event and posted his thoughts on what this might be on his online blog.  Later that day, news of the Chinese ASAT test appeared via the industry magazine, Aviation Week & Space Technology.    The missile, “launched from or near the Xichang Space Center” nearly a week earlier successfully destroyed a soon-to-be-retired Chinese weather satellite, the Feng-Yun or FY-1C.   Shortly thereafter, confirmation came from the US Government that a test appeared to have had occurred.  

By successfully destroying its aging space asset, China demonstrated a new and relatively advanced capability.  However, given the satellite’s fixed, known, and low orbit in space, the test was not as difficult as it would likely be in a conflict scenario when satellites’ positions might be adjusted, countermeasures might be employed, or pre-emptive actions taken, for instance.   Nor was the test necessarily that surprising in terms of the technology applied since, according to industry analysts, “…the tools required to build a working ASAT have proliferated widely during the past few years.  A simple direct-ascent ASAT based on a ballistic missile or scientific sounding rocket is now well within the grasp of a determined developing state.”   In other words, China’s ASAT demonstration relied on what is a basic, kinetic or “hit-to-kill” capability rather than on a more sophisticated or specifically anti-satellite technology (e.g., a space-based laser), which might not be that difficult for a country like China with many decades’ experience in rocket launches.  In fact, as noted by US General Cartwright, then-Commander of US Strategic Command, “It was impressive, the science and the engineering that went into that activity to get them to that level of capability.  As suggested in this comment and as outlined in the latest White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2006, the PRC is becoming more adept at —not to mention more dependent upon— launching satellites of different sizes, orbits, and types for the purposes of broadcasting, telecommunications, navigation and positioning, scientific research, weather forecasting, earth and resource monitoring, as well as space exploration.  It remains to be seen whether China will continue to advance its ASAT capabilities beyond the current level of development or beyond the present ground-based (versus space-based) method. 

Yet, China’s arms control policy has long supported the multinational effort at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) to agree on an international arms control framework for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).   This initiative, however, has been stalled for over a decade by the lack of consensus on whether to move forward.  China, along with Russia, continues to advocate banning the use of weapons in outer space and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee at the CD to pursue the issue, while the United States (joined by Israel and a few other states led by Micronesia) is opposed to negotiating a new arms control regime that would govern space.   At the 2005 CD meeting at which the now-annual draft PAROS was under review, the United States voted a declarative “no” rather than abstain for the first time, a position repeated in 2006.  The US position was made even more declarative in the August 2006 release of a new US National Space Policy, which states that “The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.”

But rather than announce or explain the reasons behind its ASAT test, officials of the PRC Government remained silent for almost two weeks before confirming the event had even taken place.  Reminiscent of the EP-3 incident six years ago, the Chinese Foreign Ministry appeared initially to be in the dark about their country’s own extraordinary test, only confirming the event at a press conference on January 23rd.   A spokesman at the Chinese Ministry of Defense, however, continued to claim ignorance, reportedly saying “We don't know anything about this,” in reference to reporters’ questions about the test.  

While the exact reason(s) behind this delay are unknown, there has been much speculation about China’s intent, as discussed in the next section below.

Interpreting China’s ASAT Test

There are several schools of thought on how to interpret China’s actions, with no clear consensus on which is most accurate.  A brief overview of some of the most popular interpretations includes the following suppositions: 

• Chinese President Hu Jintao didn’t know about the military’s pending test.  This sensational interpretation was suggested in a New York Times article quoting National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. He is quoted therein as indicating the test might have been a ploy by China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, to “ensure that the [ASAT] issue will now get ventilated at the highest levels in China.” Noted China experts, however, are skeptical of this assertion, believing that the PLA would not make such a dramatic move without central leadership authorization.  
• Bureaucratic stovepipes prevented a well-coordinated effort.  This less sinister scenario is one more often put forth by China hands as a plausible explanation based on historical precedent.   China’s extensive government bureaucracies are not known for coordinating their activities or sharing information.  Nor is there an equivalent to the US national security council in Beijing that is tasked with doing so.  As a result, it is not unusual for the Chinese Foreign Ministry to not fully know what the Defense Ministry is doing and vice versa.  Furthermore, because the ASAT technology remains in the development stage, it’s oversight by the PLA’s General Armament Department (GAD) (a relatively new agency established in 1998 that is responsible for arms development and production) rather than the Second Artillery (which oversees China’s deployed missile forces) might also have contributed to a lack of coordinated decisionmaking among China’s foreign and defense policy officials.
• Senior Chinese leadership knew of the test and approved it for a variety of strategic reasons.  These reasons might include President Hu’s interest in placating the military’s likely desire to demonstrate a new capability in the face of advancing US space capabilities, ballistic missile defense strategy, and a bold new space policy. As analyst Dean Cheng points out, “The PLA’s 2006 Defence White Paper, unlike the 2002 and 2004 editions, made no mention of the PRC’s efforts at the United Nations to forestall space weaponization and militarization. Such an omission would not be made lightly, and suggests that the decision to undertake ASAT tests was reached sometime in advance, and was known to the top PRC leadership.”   If so, Beijing might have made a deliberate cost-benefit analysis in favor of demonstrating its ASAT capability despite the likely international controversy that would follow.  Others have argued that the test reflects a deliberate strategy by Beijing to counter US military capabilities by adopting asymmetrical capabilities targeted at weak points in an otherwise superior US force structure.
• Beijing might not have understood the scope of controversy and the debris problem its test would provoke.  Many analyses of China’s missile test, however, dispute this view and point to the fact that China should have known that such a test would be viewed as provocative and would result in a large debris field that would then endanger US and other space assets for decades to come.  Given the nature of the kinetic test (i.e., the orbit, speed, and size), it is hard to imagine that Chinese engineers did not foresee the extensive amount of debris the test would cause.  Also, as one analyst points out citing Beijing’s own Space White Paper, “China has ‘actively participated’ in the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, initiated a Space Debris Action Plan, and increased international exchanges on space debris research.”   Nor would the test’s likely fallout fully accord with provisions set out in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, to which China is a signatory.   Such a seemingly careless action would also not fit the “responsible stakeholder” status that US officials have in recent years urged the PRC to adopt as China rises in global status, and a moniker that Beijing would like to achieve.
• Finally, as already suggested, the test might have been designed as a shot across the US bow.  In other words, the objective of the test was to influence US policymaking.  The problem with this explanation is that there are a number of fronts where this could apply.  Was it a message with regard to Taiwan, and a warning of growing PRC capabilities designed to thwart US assistance to Taiwan in the event of conflict?   Or was it a negotiating tactic related to China’s efforts to promote passage of a PAROS agreement and a means of gaining US attention to the topic?   Perhaps it was intended as a warning shot vis-à-vis US ballistic missile defense capabilities — both theater and strategic— which China views as threatening to its own nuclear deterrent?  Whatever the potential purpose was, however, it is likely to have backfired.  In the short-term at least, the impact has been a US policy backlash.

US Policy Responses to China’s ASAT Test

Prior to the latest controversy over China’s ASAT test, US-China space relations had been on a relatively positive trajectory.  Although US-China relations remain difficult over the question of satellite technology policy as a result of investigations into US companies’ technology transfer activities to China in the late 1990s, US-China space relations had recently entered a new era of cooperation.  Officials of the China National Space Administration (CNSA) were invited by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to attend an international conference of space agencies in the spring of 2006. More importantly, during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington in April of that year, President Bush announced that NASA Administrator Michael Griffin would accept an invitation to visit the PRC in fall 2006 to discuss possible cooperation on lunar exploration.   This landmark visit by NASA to its PRC counterparts suggested the possible dawning of a new space-based partnership.  However, this prospect was quickly dampened by the January 2007 ASAT test, which has effectively frozen all prospects for US-China space-related cooperation and, at least temporarily, reduced opportunities or enthusiasm for space-related arms control agreements with the PRC.

Yet, as pointed out by General Cartwright, former Commander of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), “There are 16 or more nations with a demonstrated capability to operate 10 or more satellites on orbit…Seven of the 16 nations are non-NATO countries, to include China, Russia, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Brazil and Japan. We expect many more nations to expand their national interests into space and, unfortunately, we anticipate some will challenge the free use of space.”   This has led to enhanced efforts to establish more “rules of the road” for use by US entities and possibly also other space-faring countries in the future as well as discussion of what other options and offensive and defensive capabilities (particularly space-based) that the United States might pursue as a result of China’s recent test.

Another expected response will be on Capitol Hill.  One issue currently under review is a reportedly new stealth satellite program that Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell and leading Senate leaders have determined is not needed but that appropriators might include in upcoming legislation using the Chinese ASAT test as justification.   Other legislative efforts are likely to invoke China’s ASAT activities, particularly when paired with Beijing’s spring announcement of a nearly 18% increase in annual military spending.  As one Congressional observer notes, “Whether or not Beijing’s decisions to go forward with the ASAT test and to increase its military budget were intentional, they have sharply redirected skeptical attention on China within Congress.”

What more the future holds remains difficult to forecast.  The one thing that is clear is that China is continuing to advance its technological capacity in the commercial and military satellite and anti-satellite arenas as well as in space exploration.  China is among the world’s leading launch service providers for satellites, and recently sold the first Chinese-made satellite along with launch services to Nigeria.  China is meanwhile building its own orbital satellite navigation and positioning system known as Beidou (Compass), which is intended to serve a similar purpose as the US Global Positioning System (GPS).  China’s manned space exploration era commenced in October 2003 with the successful launch of China’s first piloted vehicle into outer space, which again marked China as only the third country ever to accomplish this space-based feat.  Accordingly, China’s latest Space Science Development Plan (2006-2010) includes several ambitious new advances for PRC taikonauts (astronauts) to attempt.  Along with space exploration and enhanced space communications, another science and technology area on which China will be focusing in the coming years will be remote sensing capabilities.

As assessed in the Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military modernization, it is evident that:

China seeks to become a world leader in space development and maintain a leading role in space launch activity.  Beijing’s goal is to place a satellite into orbit ‘within hours upon request.’  With increasingly capable satellites, China is becoming competitive in some markets, but is not yet among the world’s technological leaders.

The end result, however, barring an unexpected enhanced understanding of China’s space-related capabilities and intentions, could well be that more Sputnik-like advances are in store.

Supplemental Reading: 

• Bao Shixiu, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. 
• Bruce Blair and Chen Yali, “The Space Security Dilemma." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 2-15.
• Eric Hagt, "Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 84-106.
• Eric Hagt, “China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response." China Security. (Winter 2007): 31-51. 
• Theresa Hitchens, “U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 12-30. 
• Joan Johnson-Freese, “China’s Space Ambitions,” Proliferation Paper, IFRI  (Summer 2007).
• Joan Johnson-Freese, “Strategic Communication with China: What message about space?." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 37-57.
• James A. Lewis, “Between the U.S. and China: The Current Dynamics of Military Space,” Presentation for IFRI (February 2007).
• Erik Quam, “CNS Forum:  Experts Discuss China’s ASAT Test” (February 2, 2007).
• Ashley Tellis, “Punching the US Military’s ‘Soft Ribs’:  China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Test in Strategic Perspective,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No. 51 (June 2007), online at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb_51_tellis_final.pdf
• Jianqun Teng, "Trends in China's Space Program and the Prevention of Outer Space Weaponization." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 65-72.
• Hui Zhang, "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 24-36. 

Notes